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35 
TITLE IX AND OFFICIAL POLICY LIABILITY: 
MAXIMIZING THE LAW’S POTENTIAL TO HOLD 
EDUCATION INSTITUTIONS ACCOUNTABLE FOR 





Title IX, the federal statute that prohibits sex discrimination in education, 
plays a key role in institutional accountability for sexual misconduct that is 
perpetrated by a school’s students, faculty, and staff.
1
 The Supreme Court 
has confirmed that Title IX includes an implied right of action for money 
damages when the institution had actual notice that sexual harassment had 
occurred, or was likely to occur, and responded to that threat with deliberate 
indifference.
2
 But the deliberate indifference standard has proven to be a 
high and unpredictable bar for plaintiffs. For this reason, many institutions 
required the threat of government enforcement—issued in the form of the 
Department of Education’s 2011 “Dear Colleague Letter”
3
—to begin to 
address and improve their policies and practices for preventing and 
responding to sexual misconduct.  
Recently, however, the Department of Education has incorporated the 
judicial deliberate indifference standard into its own regulations for 
enforcing Title IX.
4
 As a result, both judicial and administrative 
enforcement of Title IX may soon converge into the same generous 
standard that puts very little pressure on institutions to proactively or 
reactively respond to sexual misconduct on their campuses and in their 
communities. By responding only minimally to sexual misconduct, an 
institution can easily avoid committing deliberate indifference, while at the 
                                                                                                             
 * Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Western New England 
University School of Law.  
 1. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688 (2018). 
 2. See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 281 (1998) (citing 
Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677 (1979); Franklin v. Gwinnett Cty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 
60 (1992)). 
 3. Letter from Russlynn Ali, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ. 
(Apr. 4, 2011), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.pdf 
[hereinafter Dear Colleague Letter].  
 4. See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities 
Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 85 Fed. Reg. 30026, 30045–46, 30574 (final rule 
published May 19, 2020, effective Aug. 14, 2020) (codified at 34 C.F.R. 106.44(a)). 
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same time steering clear of the ever-present threat of litigation by 
respondents and individuals disciplined for sexual misconduct. 
In light of this concern about unidirectional litigation pressure, this 
Article seeks to highlight a lesser-known Title IX theory of liability with 
the potential to promote institutional accountability for sexual misconduct: 
official policy liability. Simpson v. University of Colorado Boulder was the 
first case to recognize that educational institutions are liable under Title IX 
not only for indifferent response to the sexual misconduct of those under 
their control but also for sexual misconduct caused by their official 
policies.
5
 But this alternative theory of liability has not been widely utilized 
by plaintiffs’ lawyers, and the majority of judicial decisions that have 
considered it have found it not to apply.
6
  
Recently, however, two lower courts have countered this trend by 
denying motions to dismiss claims of official policy liability against both 
Baylor University
7
 and the University of Tennessee.
8
 In both cases, 
plaintiffs sought damages for sexual assault experienced at the hands of 
other students and claimed that their universities’ official policies of 
indifference to sexual misconduct caused the assault.
9
  
Part I of this Article provides background on Title IX and judicial 
enforcement under the more well-known deliberate indifference standard 
                                                                                                             
 5. See 500 F.3d 1170, 1182–85 (10th Cir. 2007); see also Wes R. McCart, Note, 
Simpson v. University of Colorado: Title IX Crashes the Party in College Athletic 
Recruiting, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 153, 166 (2008) (“At the same time, the court’s decision 
reinterpreted Title IX liability for sexual harassment by allowing for damages when the 
substantive violation is the proximate result of an educational institution’s official policy. In 
doing so, the Tenth Circuit claims to have abandoned the Gebser and Davis precedent 
regarding actual notice standards in favor of the liability standard . . . .”) (footnotes omitted). 
 6. See infra Section III.D.1.  
 7. Doe 1 v. Baylor Univ., 240 F. Supp. 3d 646, 662 n.7 (W.D. Tex. 2017) (“Because 
the Court finds that Plaintiffs have met their burden under the official-policy rubric, it does 
not evaluate this category of claims under the actual notice and deliberate indifference 
framework articulated in Gebser and Davis.”). 
 8. Doe v. Univ. of Tenn., 186 F. Supp. 3d 788, 804–08, 815–16 (M.D. Tenn. 2016). 
Specifically, in this case, the Middle District of Tennessee commented that it was 
not aware of any case before the Sixth Circuit where Title IX liability for third-
party acts has been premised on an official policy of the funding recipient, 
rather than on actual knowledge and deliberate indifference to known acts of 
harassment, [yet] the court [found] that Gebser and Davis could support such a 
theory. 
Id. at 804–05. 
 9. Doe 1, 240 F. Supp. 3d at 653–56; Univ. of Tenn., 186 F. Supp. 3d at 791–92. 
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developed in Gebser and Davis. Part II contrasts the standard of liability 
under deliberate indifference with that under official policy liability. 
Additionally, Part II traces the evolution of official policy liability from 
Simpson through the recent cases against Tennessee and Baylor. Finally, 
Part III explores the potential of official policy liability as a tool for 
maximizing Title IX’s potential to promote institutional accountability, 
even in an era characterized by lax regulatory enforcement and litigious 
respondents. 
I. Institutional Liability Under Title IX  
Title IX is a federal civil rights statute that prohibits educational 
institutions that receive money from the federal government from 
discriminating on the basis of sex.
10
 While the statute was originally aimed 
at institutional policies that restricted women’s access to graduate and 
professional school, modern judicial and regulatory interpretations have 
clarified that sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination within the 
meaning of the law.
11
 Sexual assault is an obvious subset of sexual 
harassment because it is unwelcome and severe by definition, and because 




A. Title IX’s Dual Enforcement Mechanisms 
Title IX’s express statutory language contemplates administrative 
enforcement to ensure that federal funding does not flow to institutions that 
                                                                                                             
 10. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2018). 
 11. See, e.g., Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 281 (1998); Meritor 
Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64–67 (1986) (ruling under Title VII that unwelcome 
sexual advances, when sufficiently severe or pervasive to render a workplace environment 
hostile to members of one sex); Alexander v. Yale Univ., 459 F. Supp. 1, 4 (D. Conn. 1977) 
(“[A]cademic advancement conditioned upon submission to sexual demands constitutes [a 
claim of] sex discrimination in education . . . .”), aff’d, 631 F.2d 178, 186 (2d Cir. 1980); see 
also 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1985) (including “unwelcome sexual advances” as actionable 
harassment on the basis of sex under Title VII). 
 12. See Jennings v. Univ. of N.C., 444 F.3d 255, 274 n.12 (4th Cir. 2006) 
(acknowledging that a single incident of sexual assault or rape could be sufficient to raise a 
jury question about whether a hostile environment exists); Soper v. Hoben, 195 F.3d 845, 
854–55 (6th Cir. 1999) (explaining that rape and sexual abuse “obviously qualif[y] as . . . 
severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive sexual harassment that could deprive [the 
student] of access to the educational opportunities provided by her school”). 
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discriminate on the basis of sex.
13
 Though every federal agency that 
administers federal funding to educational institutions is responsible for 
ensuring taxpayer dollars are not used to subsidize discrimination, the 
Department of Education (the “Department”) is the exemplar enforcement 
agency.
14
 The Department investigates complaints of noncompliance and 
conducts comprehensive investigations at its own initiative.
15
 When the 
Department determines that an institution has not complied with Title IX, as 
interpreted by its implementing regulations and interpretive policies and 
guidance, it gives institutions the opportunity to correct noncompliant 
policies and practices, thereby avoiding penalties.
16
 Only institutions that 
fail to resolve compliance issues voluntarily risk losing their funding, which 
occurs only after a formal hearing.
17
 To date, however, the government has 
never withdrawn federal funding from an educational institution over issues 
of Title IX compliance.
18
  
In addition, the Supreme Court has confirmed that Congress intended an 
implied private right of action that allows private litigants to supplement 
administrative enforcement in an effort to ensure Title IX accountability for 
educational institutions.
19
 This right of action allows plaintiffs to recover 
money damages
20
 or to attain injunctive relief.
21
 But as a matter of fairness 
                                                                                                             
 13. See 20 U.S.C. § 1682(a). 
 14. See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities 
Receiving Federal Financial Assistance; Final Common Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 52857, 52859 
(Aug. 30, 2000) (“As set forth in this common rule, the substantive nondiscrimination 
obligations of recipients, for the most part, are identical to those established by the 
Department of Education (“ED”) under Title IX.”); see also Title IX and Sex Discrimination, 
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (rev. Apr. 2015), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/ 
docs/tix_dis.html (noting that the Office for Civil Rights (a component of the U.S. 
Department of Education) enforces Title IX). 
 15. 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(c) (2020). 
 16. 34 C.F.R. § 106.71 (incorporating 34 C.F.R. §§ 100.7, 100.8). 
 17. Id. (incorporating 34 C.F.R. §§ 100.8, 100.9). 
 18. In the early days of Title IX enforcement, some institutions resisted efforts of the 
Department of Education’s predecessor agency, the Department of Health, Education & 
Wellness, to apply Title IX beyond the specific program that had directly received the aid. 
See Erin E. Buzuvis, Title IX and Procedural Fairness: Why Disciplined-Student Litigation 
Does Not Undermine the Role of Title IX in Campus Sexual Assault, 78 MONT. L. REV. 71, 
79 n.37 (2017). However, these institutions successfully invoked judicial review of agency 
action in order to avoid funding withdrawal, though these judicial decisions have been 
abrogated by subsequent amendments to Title IX. See id. 
 19. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 705–09 (1979). 
 20. Franklin v. Gwinnett Cty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 75–76 (1992). 
 21. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 285–86 (1998). 
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to educational institutions, the Supreme Court has held that schools may 
only be liable for their own intentional and unlawful conduct.
22
  
Moreover, courts cannot force institutions to pay damages on a theory of 
vicarious liability or for accidental harm because Title IX is, at its core, a 
spending statute.
23
 Title IX is essentially a bilateral agreement between 
educational institutions and the federal government. According to that 
agreement, the federal government agrees to provide funding, and the 
recipients agree to the government’s terms and conditions—including the 
condition not to engage in sex discrimination.
24
  
As between these two parties, the remedy for breach, then, is the 
withdrawal of federal funds. Educational institutions arguably lack notice of 
the fact that, by accepting federal funding from the government, they could 
be liable to a “third party” such as a student or employee who experiences 
sex discrimination in violation of Title IX.
25
 But regulatory enforcement of 
Title IX raises no such concern because notice is built into the enforcement 
process. If an institution is ignorant of its obligation to comply with Title 




Similarly, judicially imposed injunctions only apply on a prospective 
basis and, therefore, avoid notice concerns. But with regard to money 
damages, the Supreme Court has insisted that only an institution’s 
intentional misconduct can give rise to such liability because, unlike 
                                                                                                             
 22. Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 642–43 (1999); Gebser, 524 U.S. 
at 290 (“Consequently, in cases like this one that do not involve official policy of the 
recipient entity, we hold that a damages remedy will not lie under Title IX unless an official 
who at a minimum has authority to address the alleged discrimination and to institute 
corrective measures on the recipient’s behalf has actual knowledge of discrimination in the 
recipient’s programs and fails adequately to respond.”). 
 23. Congress does not have plenary power to regulate educational institutions, but it 
does have the power to appropriate federal funds. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. As an extension of 
this power, Congress routinely imposes conditions that obligate the recipients of such 
funding to comply with requirements that Congress would not necessarily have the power to 
impose directly. See, e.g., Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 
(1981) (“Unlike legislation enacted under § 5, however, legislation enacted pursuant to the 
spending power is much in the nature of a contract: in return for federal funds, the States 
agree to comply with federally imposed conditions.”). 
 24. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2018). 
 25. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 641–42; Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290–91; Franklin, 503 U.S. at 
74–75. 
 26. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 288 (discussing that the regulatory scheme requires notice 
before imposing financial penalties). 
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accidents or vicarious liability, intentional misconduct is entirely within the 
institution’s power to prevent and control.
27
 Therefore, to ensure that the 
liability for damages does not sneak up on an unsuspecting funding 
recipient, the remedy only applies to cases involving intentional 
discrimination. 
B. Judicial Enforcement and the Deliberate Indifference Standard 
While money damages would appear to only apply in narrow cases, the 
Court has expanded situations where a funding recipient is deemed to 
intentionally discriminate. Significantly, in Gebser v. Lago Vista 
Independent School District, the Supreme Court held that an institution’s 
deliberate indifference to a known violation of Title IX is a form of 
intentional discrimination that courts may remedy with money damages.
28
 
Later, in Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, the Supreme Court 
articulated the necessary elements that a plaintiff must establish in cases 
seeking money damages for student-on-student sexual harassment and 
assault.
29
 Under the Gebser/Davis standard, a plaintiff must prove that (1) 
an appropriate person, or someone with authority, had actual notice of 
sexual harassment or sexual assault;
30
 (2) notwithstanding such notice, the 
institution responded with deliberate indifference; and (3) the sexual 
harassment was “so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it 




This deliberate indifference standard has proven difficult for plaintiffs to 
satisfy for a number of reasons. First, the gold standard for actual notice is 
that institutional officials knew that the perpetrator of sexual misconduct 
                                                                                                             
 27. Id. at 290.  
 28. Id. at 290–93.  
 29. Davis, 526 U.S. at 642–45. 
 30. Later courts have clarified that the notice may address an incident that had occurred, 
was occurring, or was threatened. Williams v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 477 
F.3d 1282, 1293–94 (11th Cir. 2007); Escue v. N. Okla. Coll., 450 F.3d 1146, 1153 (10th 
Cir. 2006) (“[H]arassment of persons other than the plaintiff may provide the school with the 
requisite notice to impose liability under Title IX.”); Delgado v. Stegall, 367 F.3d 668, 672 
(7th Cir. 2004) (internal citations omitted) (“[I]n Davis the Court required knowledge only 
of ‘acts of sexual harassment’ by the [harasser], not of previous acts directed against the 
particular plaintiff.”), abrogated by Doe No. 55 v. Madison Metro. Sch. Dist., 897 F.3d 819 
(7th Cir. 2018). 
 31. Davis, 526 U.S. at 633.  
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol73/iss1/4
2020]       TITLE IX & OFFICIAL POLICY LIABILITY 41 
 
 
had offended in an identical way in the past against the same victim.
32
 Prior 
misconduct by the same perpetrator that is less severe than the misconduct 
in the plaintiff’s case will often fail to provide actual notice.
33
 In the same 
way, prior similar misconduct by the same perpetrator that is directed at a 
different victim
34
 or misconduct that is committed by someone other than 
the perpetrator may not be sufficient notice.
35
 
Second, courts are reluctant to impose liability under the Gebser/Davis 
standard for sexual misconduct committed by someone other than a student 
or employee of the educational institution defendant.
36
 As with the other 
limitations of Gebser/Davis liability, the requirement that institutions have 
control over the harasser is rooted in fairness concerns that arise when 
compensatory damages are at issue. As a result, however, the threat of 
liability for damages provides little incentive to address even known threats 
posed by outsiders.  
Third, the location of the misconduct can also make it more difficult for 
the plaintiff to satisfy the Gebser/Davis standard. This is especially true in 
cases where courts reject the idea that institutional liability could apply to 
misconduct that occurs between students in off-campus housing.
37
  
                                                                                                             
 32. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, In Their Hands: Restoring Institutional Liability for 
Sexual Harassment in Education, 125 YALE L.J. 2038, 2070 (2016). 
 33. Id. (citing Harden v. Rosie, 99 A.3d 950, 954–63 (Pa. 2014)). 
 34. Id. (citing Wills v. Brown Univ., 184 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 1999)). 
 35. Id. 
 36. E.g., Hall v. Millersville Univ., 400 F. Supp. 3d 252, 289 (E.D. Pa. 2019) (reasoning 
that “educational institutions [are] on notice that they face potential liability for the 
misconduct of their students or other parties whom they play a critical role in connecting 
with the student” but not “a guest whom the university had no role in bringing to campus”); 
Samuelson v. Or. State Univ., 162 F. Supp. 3d 1123, 1134 (D. Or. 2016) (finding that the 
university “had no chance to vet” the harasser), aff’d, 725 F. App’x 598 (9th Cir. 2018). The 
University of Utah is being sued by parents of a student who was murdered in her dorm 
room by her boyfriend non-student. Hanna Knowles & Marisa Iati, An Officer Allegedly 
Showed Explicit Photos of a Woman Later Killed by Her Ex-Boyfriend, WASH. POST (May 
19, 2020, 7:34 AM CDT), https://www.washingtonpost.com/education/2020/05/18/an-
officer-allegedly-showed-off-explicit-photos-woman-later-killed-by-her-boyfriend/. The 
parents allege that the university had knowledge of the threat, but the University contends 
that they cannot be liable for damages under Title IX because the assailant was not a student. 
See Hall v. Millersville Univ., 400 F. Supp. 3d 252, 289–90 (E.D. Pa. 2019). 
 37. See Roe v. St. Louis Univ., 746 F.3d 874, 884 (8th Cir. 2014) (“The Supreme Court 
has made it clear, however, that to be liable for deliberate indifference under Title IX, a 
University must have had control over the situation in which the harassment or rape 
occurs.”) (citing Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 645 (1999)); see also 
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Finally, the Gebser/Davis standard defines deliberate indifference as a 
“clearly unreasonable” response to the threat it has received notice of.
38
 
Consequently, this standard permits educational institutions to avoid 
liability in most cases. Even institutions that fail to respond at all to notice 
of a threat of sexual misconduct can sometimes avoid liability. For 
example, a university might not investigate a student’s reported rape 
because it believed in good faith that investigative efforts would hinder law 
enforcement,
39
 or that the student’s failure to file a formal complaint 
justified a lack of response.
40
  
Incomplete and impartial responses are even more likely to survive 
challenge. Even institutions whose responses violate their own policies,
41
 or 
                                                                                                             
Hannah Brenner Johnson, Standing In Between Sexual Violence Victims and Access to 
Justice: The Limits of Title IX, 73 OKLA. L. REV. 37 (2020). 
 38. MacKinnon, supra note 32, at 2066–67 (quoting Davis, 526 U.S. at 648); see also 
A.J. Bolan, Note, Deliberate Indifference: Why Universities Must Do More to Protect 
Students from Sexual Assault, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 804, 816 n.71 (2018) (citing examples 
of cases that demonstrate the weakness of the deliberate indifference standard).  
 39. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. 15-cv-05779-RS, 2016 WL 2961984, at 
*6 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2016). Nonresponse does give rise to liability in other cases. See, e.g., 
Jennings v. Univ. of N.C., 482 F.3d 686, 700–01 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding that deliberate 
indifference could be satisfied by evidence that university official dismissed plaintiff’s 
complaint about sexual harassment by her coach, telling her that that coach “was a ‘great 
guy’ and that she should work out her problems directly with him”).  
 40. St. Louis Univ., 746 F.3d at 883; see also Ross v. Univ. of Tulsa, 180 F. Supp. 3d 
951, 969 (N.D. Okla. 2016) (“Campus security officers and school administrators walk a 
fine line when they investigate a report of sexual assault by a victim who is unwilling to 
proceed or make any specific accusations. . . . [The victim] only had one semester left of 
school and did not want any disruption of her life prior to her graduation. Interviewing [the 
victim’s friend, the assaulter], and other members of the small [University of Tulsa] campus 
or ultimately taking action against [the assaulter] would undoubtedly have caused this type 
of unwanted disruption. While perhaps not in accordance with Title IX best practices or the 
OCR’s guidance in the DCL, [the university’s] response [to the victim’s report] could not be 
deemed ‘deliberately indifferent’ in light of the nature of such report.”), aff’d, 859 F.3d 1280 
(10th Cir. 2017). But see Butters v. James Madison Univ., 145 F. Supp. 3d 610, 614, 621 
(W.D. Va. 2015) (denying motion to dismiss where university justified its alleged failure to 
respond on complainant’s unwillingness to file a formal complaint). 
 41. Facchetti v. Bridgewater Coll., 175 F. Supp. 3d 627, 637–39 (W.D. Va. 2016) 
(concluding that plaintiff did not sufficiently allege deliberate indifference even though her 
complaint alleged that the university violated its own policy by deterring her from reporting 
the matter to the police, failing to advise her of her rights, preventing her from presenting 
witnesses, and excluding her from information about the disciplinary process); Thomas v. 
Bd. of Trs. of the Neb. State Coll., No. 8:12-CV-412, 2015 WL 4546712, at *13–14 (D. 
Neb. July 28, 2015) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that university’s failure to ensure that  the 
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violate policies promulgated by the Office for Civil Rights
42
 have avoided 
liability under the deliberate indifference standard. 
C. Deliberate Indifference as the New Regulatory Standard?  
Because deliberate indifference is the legal equivalent of intentional 
discrimination, the Gebser/Davis standard sets a low bar for institutions to 
clear in order to avoid liability. It is, by design, a much more permissive 
standard than regulators should use in their enforcement efforts. For many 
years, the Department of Education expressly acknowledged its authority to 
hold institutions to a higher standard than deliberate indifference.
43
 The 
Department requires institutions subject to Title IX to engage in a “prompt 





 and again in 2001, the Office for Civil Rights (“OCR”), which 
is the agency within the Department of Education that enforces civil rights 
laws prohibiting discrimination in schools,
46
 confirmed that this 
requirement applies to sexual harassment (a subset of sex discrimination, 
which is prohibited by Title IX).
47
 OCR also confirmed that an institution’s 
response must include “immediate and appropriate steps to investigate or 
otherwise determine what occurred.”
48
 Those initial steps must then be 
                                                                                                             
student accused of rape and murder completed sanctions for earlier acts of misconduct was 
deliberate indifference), aff’d, 667 F. App’x 560 (8th Cir. 2016) (per curiam). 
 42. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 291–92 (1998); Karasek v. 
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 956 F.3d 1093, 1107–09 (9th Cir. 2020). At best, courts 
consider noncompliance with the regulatory standard a factor to consider in the overall 
assessment of deliberate indifference. Butters v. James Madison Univ., 208 F. Supp. 3d 745, 
757 (W.D. Va. 2016); Doe v. Forest Hills Sch. Dist., No. 1:13-CV-428, 2015 WL 9906260, 
at *9–10 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2015).  
 43. See OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
GUIDANCE: HARASSMENT OF STUDENTS BY SCHOOL EMPLOYEES, OTHER STUDENTS, OR THIRD 
PARTIES iii–iv (2001), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/shguide.pdf 
[hereinafter 2001 REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE] (noting that the Gebser and 
Davis standards apply to private causes of action for monetary damages).  
 44. See id. at iii. 
 45. Sexual Harassment Guidance 1997, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., https://www2.ed.gov/ 
about/offices/list/ocr/docs/sexhar01.html (last visited June 1, 2020).  
 46. See About OCR, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/ 
aboutocr.html (last visited June 1, 2020). 
 47. 2001 REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 43, at 19–20 (noting that 
schools should “provid[e] . . . prompt and equitable resolution” to sexual harassment 
claims). 
 48. Id. at 15. 
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followed by “steps reasonably calculated to end any harassment, eliminate a 
hostile environment if one has been created, and prevent harassment from 
occurring again.”
49
 Furthermore, the school is “responsible for taking steps 
to remedy the effects of the harassment on the [affected] individual.”
50 
OCR 
otherwise avoided imposing specific and uniform requirements on diverse 
educational institutions, instead preferring a “prompt and equitable” case-
by-case evaluation that maximizes institutions’ flexibility to create 
procedures best suited to their needs.
51
  
In the wake of increased public attention to the problem of sexual assault 
on college campuses and lackluster responses by university officials, OCR 
offered further clarification in a Dear Colleague Letter released on April 4, 
2011.
52
 This clarification aimed to end certain institutional practices, 
including the following:  




$ Imposing watered-down or no sanctions on responsible parties;54  
$ Discouraging victims from filing complaints—sometimes by 








$ Prohibiting victims from speaking about the matter;57 and  
$ Failing to inform victims of investigation outcomes.58  
Further, the Dear Colleague Letter required a university to investigate even 
when the alleged victim refused to file a complaint or actively participate in 
                                                                                                             
 49. Id. 
 50. Id.  
 51. Id. at 19–20. 
 52. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 3. 
 53. Id. at 8 n.23.  
 54. See id. at 12–13. 
 55. Id. at 8.  
 56. Id. at 9–12.  
 57. Id. at 14. 
 58. Id. at 13–14. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol73/iss1/4





 Even though it is not appropriate to impose 
sanctions on an alleged perpetrator whose victim does not testify, the Dear 
Colleague Letter imposed a duty to respond to sexual assault that extended 
beyond efforts to identify and discipline the perpetrator. It also required 
universities to “pursue other steps to limit the effects of the alleged 
harassment and prevent its recurrence.”
60
 Such obligations include 
providing support and accommodations for the victim and engaging the 
community in prevention and training efforts.
61
 
The current administration is changing course. First, the OCR withdrew 
the 2011 Dear Colleague Letter.
62
 Then, in November 2018, the Office 
proposed new regulations that incorporate the judicial deliberate 
indifference standard into its enforcement standard.
63
 It finalized these 
regulations in May 2020,
64
 codifying the deliberate indifference standard in 
a new provision, 34 C.F.R. 106.44(a): 
A recipient with actual knowledge of sexual harassment in an 
education program or activity of the recipient against a person 
in the United States, must respond promptly in a manner that 
                                                                                                             
 59. Id. at 5. 
 60. Id. The Letter also explains that in serious cases, an institution should not let the 
victim’s request for confidentiality limit the university’s response in ways that jeopardize the 
safety of the community. Id. at 5–6. 
 61. Id. at 5–6. Subsequent guidance clarified this point even further. See Office for Civil 
Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Questions and Answers on Title IX and Sexual Violence 20 
(Apr. 29, 2014), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/qa-201404-title-ix.pdf 
(“Examples include providing increased monitoring, supervision, or security at locations or 
activities where the misconduct occurred; providing training and education materials for 
students and employees; changing and publicizing the school’s policies on sexual violence; 
and conducting climate surveys regarding sexual violence. In instances affecting many 
students, an alleged perpetrator can be put on notice of allegations of harassing behavior and 
be counseled appropriately without revealing, even indirectly, the identity of the student 
complainant. A school must also take immediate action as necessary to protect the student 
while keeping the identity of the student confidential. These actions may include providing 
support services to the student and changing living arrangements or course schedules, 
assignments, or tests.”).  
 62. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities 
Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 83 Fed. Reg. 61462, 61464–65 n.10 (proposed Nov. 
29, 2018) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 106). 
 63. Id. at 61466.  
 64. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities 
Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 85 Fed. Reg. 30026, 30033–46, 30574 (final rule 
published May 19, 2020, effective Aug. 14, 2020) (codified at 34 C.F.R. 106.44(a)). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2020
46 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:35 
 
 
is not deliberately indifferent. A recipient is deliberately 
indifferent only if its response to sexual harassment is clearly 
unreasonable in light of the known circumstances.65 
The Department of Education has also diluted the notice standard that 
had previously been used in enforcement efforts. Whereas the prior 
administration required educational institutions to respond to sexual 
harassment that they “kn[ew] or reasonably should know about,”
66
 the new 
regulations adopt the judicial standard of actual knowledge in this regard, as 
well.
67
 This change reduces institutional accountability by ensuring that 
neither administrative enforcement nor judicial enforcement under the 
Gebser/Davis standard adequately pressures universities to address 
situations where the threat was not formally reported to university officials, 
even though they may have encountered information from which they 
reasonably should have understood that a threat existed or inquired further 
about this possibility. It may even provide incentive for university officials 
to avoid information that would give them actual knowledge of a threat.
68
  
By unnecessarily adopting the Gebser/Davis standard for institutional 
liability, the new regulations therefore threaten to weaken Title IX’s role in 
holding institutions accountable for responding to sexual misconduct 
committed by students, faculty, and staff. Because it is already difficult for 
victims to hold institutions accountable for mishandling Title IX 
adjudications, it is time to examine other theories of liability that might be 
brought to bear on educational institutions. 
  
                                                                                                             
 65. 34 C.F.R. 106.44(a) (2020).  
 66. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 3, at 4; see also 2001 REVISED SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 43, at iv. 
 67. See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities 
Receiving Federal Assistance, 85 Fed. Reg. at 30089 (defining “actual knowledge” to mean 
“notice of sexual harassment or allegations of sexual harassment to a recipient’s Title IX 
Coordinator or any official of the recipient who has the authority to institute corrective 
measures on behalf of the recipient”). 
 68. See, e.g., American Association of University Professors, Comments on the 
Department of Education’s Proposed Title IX Regulations 2 (Jan. 28, 2019), 
https://www.aaup.org/sites/default/files/AAUP%20title%20IX%20exec%20summary_0.pdf; 
see generally Nancy Chi Cantalupo, Burying Our Heads in the Sand: Lack of Knowledge, 
Knowledge Avoidance, and the Persistent Problem of Campus Peer Sexual Violence, 43 
LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 205 (2011). 
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II. Official Policy Liability  
Most sexual misconduct cases arising from the educational setting are 
litigated under the Gebser/Davis standard, which only imposes liability for 
an institution’s indifferent response to the known acts of others. However, 
Title IX also imposes liability on educational institutions for their own, 
official discriminatory policies, custom, or pattern of practice.
69
 This theory 
of liability is so commonplace in Title IX cases—outside the sexual 
misconduct context—that it is rarely named or discussed outside of certain 
situations; for example, when a court must correct the mistaken belief that a 
university athletic department must have actual notice and respond with 




In the context of sexual harassment, however, cases alleging 
discriminatory official policy are comparatively rare. Yet, it is clear that 
Gebser and Davis did not foreclose the application of official policy 
liability to the sexual harassment context. Simpson v. University of 
Colorado Boulder was the first case to apply official policy liability in this 
way.
71
 Though most lower courts that had an opportunity to consider 
official policy liability claims in the sexual harassment context rejected its 
application, the recent cases involving Tennessee and Baylor may be 
breathing new life into this doctrine.  
A. Official Policy Liability’s Supreme Court Origins  
When the Supreme Court established the deliberate indifference standard 
in Gebser and Davis, it did not proffer that standard as the exclusive Title 
IX remedy for sexual harassment. While both cases utilized a deliberate 
indifference standard to assess institutional liability for sexual misconduct 
committed by a third party under its control, neither plaintiff alleged that 
the institution’s indifference amounted to, or stemmed from, the 
                                                                                                             
 69. See infra Section IV.A.1. 
 70. See, e.g., Mansourian v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 602 F.3d 957, 969 (9th Cir. 
2010) (“We therefore join the Fifth Circuit in holding that Gebser’s notice requirement is 
inapplicable to cases alleging that a funding recipient has failed effectively to accommodate 
women’s interest in athletics.”); Pederson v. La. State Univ., 213 F.3d 858, 882 (5th Cir. 
2000) (“In the instant case, it is the institution itself that is discriminating. The proper test is 
not whether it knew of or is responsible for the actions of others, but is whether Appellees 
intended to treat women differently on the basis of their sex by providing them unequal 
athletic opportunity . . . .”). 
 71. 500 F.3d 1170 (10th Cir. 2007). 
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university’s own official policy.
72
 The Gebser Court expressly noted this 
distinction, limiting the applicability of the standard it employed to “cases 
like this one that do not involve official policy of the recipient entity.”
73
 
This language created the possibility that, even in cases involving sexual 
harassment, institutions might be liable for their own discriminatory policy 
under a standard distinct from the Gebser/Davis standard. 
Additionally, when crafting the Gebser/Davis standard, the Supreme 
Court supported the idea that deliberate indifference was tantamount to 
intentional discrimination when it analogized it to the standard for 
municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Because the standard for 
municipal liability defines intentional discrimination to include both 
indifference to the discriminatory acts of employees and discriminatory 
policies and practices of the municipality itself,
74
 the Court’s reference to 
municipal liability supports a parallel interpretation of intentional 
discrimination under Title IX, as well: incorporating both the education 
institution’s deliberate indifference to acts of discrimination committed by 
its students or employees, as well as discriminatory official policies and 
practices of the educational institution itself.
75
 
B. Simpson v. University of Colorado Boulder  
In the 2007 case of Simpson v. University of Colorado Boulder, a federal 
appellate court examined official policy liability in a sexual harassment 
case for the first time.
76
 Here, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reinstated 
two plaintiffs’ claims that the university was liable for their sexual assaults, 
which were perpetrated by high school students on a recruiting visit hosted 
                                                                                                             
 72. See Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 644 (1999); Gebser v. Lago 
Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290–93 (1998). 
 73. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290.  
 74. Id. at 291; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018). The Tenth Circuit in Simpson noted 
this connection as well. Simpson, 500 F.3d at 1178 (“[I]t is when execution of a 
government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or 
acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as 
an entity is responsible under § 1983.”) (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 
U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). 
 75. For example, under the § 1983 standard, a municipality may be held liable for 
discrimination inherent in its own staffing or training policy if the policy is obviously 
inadequate to protect likely violations of constitutional rights—such as arming police with 
weapons but failing to train officers on when the use of deadly force is legal. See Simpson, 
500 F.3d at 1178–79 (discussing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989)).  
 76. Id. at 1184–85.  
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by the University of Colorado football team.
77
 The university had arranged 
for female undergraduates to host the recruits and “show them a good 
time,” which the recruits apparently understood to mean sex.
78
 Though the 
plaintiffs framed the case utilizing the typical Gebser/Davis framework, the 




The court based this theory on the university’s own discriminatory 
policy, which set up unsupervised high school football players with 
underclass female students with no clear instructions other than a general 
expectation to appeal and entertain.
80
 The court noted that the football 
program’s failure to train or supervise the female students hired to host 
football recruits and “show them a good time” was deliberate indifference 
to an obvious risk, akin to a municipality that fails to train police officers on 
the proper deployment of firearms it provides.
81
 The risk of sexual 
misconduct in college football programs in general—and at the University 
of Colorado in particular—had been well-known for years and documented 
by research and media accounts.
82
 Numerous instances of sexual assault 
involving football recruits or the football program had occurred frequently 
enough in the past without athletic department officials intervening or 
addressing the program, despite the urging of law enforcement and others.
83
 
Therefore, the court found that there was evidence that could establish a 
causal link between the university’s official policy and the risk of sexual 
misconduct. 
C. Simpson in Contrast to the Gebser/Davis Deliberate Indifference 
Standard 
One way to understand how the Simpson standard differs from the 
Gebser/Davis standard is to contrast the appellate court’s decision with the 
lower court’s decision. The lower court in Simpson relied on the 
Gebser/Davis standard to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims.
84
 In doing so, the 
                                                                                                             
 77. Id. at 1173. 
 78. Id. at 1180 (quoting Appellant’s App. Volume VII at 1343). 
 79. Id. at 1175–78. 
 80. Id. at 1180. 
 81. Id. at 1178–79 (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 n.10 (1989)).  
 82. Id. at 1181. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Simpson v. Univ. of Colo., 372 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1233–35 (D. Colo. 2005), rev’d, 
500 F.3d 1170 (10th Cir. 2007). 
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district court acknowledged that though Gebser/Davis liability is not 
limited to situations involving institutional indifference to a threat posed by 
precisely the same individual as the one who caused the harm, it does 
require that an institution ignore a “well-defined and focused” risk of 
harm.
85
 Though the head coach and other officials were aware of prior 
sexual misconduct committed by individuals involved in the football 
program, those prior instances were distinguishable from the harm that the 
plaintiffs faced.
86
 In those instances, either the sexual misconduct was 
committed by football recruits but not against current students, or the 
misconduct was committed against other students but by current players 
and not recruits.
87
 The Simpson plaintiffs could not prove that, prior to their 
sexual assaults, the head coach and other officials knew with certainty that 
recruiting events had included alcohol, strippers, and lap dances.
88
 As to 
what the officials did know, the court determined that they were not 
deliberately indifferent because they responded to the incident by 
disciplining the players involved.
89
 
The analyses of the appellate and district courts in Simpson illustrate two 
key differences between Title IX liability under official policy liability and 
the Gebser/Davis standard. The first key difference is the extent to which 
courts may infer notice of discrimination. The notice requirement under the 
Gebser/Davis standard permits a narrower range of inferences from past 
events and discounts knowledge of general risks.
90
 In contrast, a 
university’s official policy can be discriminatory if it fails to address a clear 
or obvious risk, where obviousness can be established by a wider range of 
information.
91
 The appellate court in Simpson did not limit its notice inquiry 
to the limited facts of the alleged sexual assault at issue—incidents between 
students and football recruits. Instead, the court considered what knowledge 
university and football officials generally had of sexual misconduct within 
its football program and other college football programs.
92
  
                                                                                                             
 85. Id. at 1236.  
 86. Id. at 1238–40. 
 87. Id.  
 88. Id. at 1240–42.  
 89. Id. at 1244–45. 
 90. See id. at 1236 (“In other words, the risk at issue must be well-defined and focused 
to support a claim of Title IX liability.”). 
 91. See Simpson v. Univ. of Colo. Boulder, 500 F.3d 1170, 1178 (10th Cir. 2007).  
 92. Id. at 1180–85. 
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The second key difference is the role institutional policies play. The 
Gebser/Davis standard permits institutions to avoid liability by taking 
narrow, focused steps in response to the particular circumstances of known 
events.
93
 Consequently, an institution would rarely be faulted for failing to 
address systemic shortcomings with policy changes. But under official 
policy liability, institutional policies are much more important than narrow 
responses to prior events. In Simpson, the appellate court made clear that 




In sum, Simpson v. University of Colorado Boulder confirms official 
policy liability as a distinct alternative to the Gebser/Davis deliberate 
indifference standard. It also illustrates how Title IX promotes institutional 
accountability for official decisions, as opposed to isolated instances of 
indifference, and for institutions’ failure to address clear and obvious risks 
that would not necessarily satisfy the actual notice requirement.  
D. Official Policy Liability After Simpson  
Few judicial decisions address official policy claims in the context of 
sexual misconduct. Among the small subset of Title IX sexual misconduct 
cases that do include official policy claims, most produce decisions in 
which the court distinguishes Simpson and rejects the claim. Thus, recent 
decisions in which lower courts rejected motions to dismiss official policy 
claims against Baylor University and the University of Tennessee are 
noteworthy. 
1. Post-Simpson Official Policy Cases 
In decisions rejecting official policy claims, courts commonly 
distinguish Simpson on the grounds that the official policy in that case was 
one that affirmatively encouraged sexual misconduct. For example, a 
federal court in Kansas dismissed claims that a university’s policy against 
investigating off-campus sexual violence constituted a discriminatory 
official policy under Title IX.
95
 “Unlike in Simpson,” the court reasoned, 
the university “did not have an official policy that affirmatively encouraged 
students to engage in conduct off campus that could lead to sexual 
                                                                                                             
 93. See Simpson v. Univ. of Colo., 372 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1235–37 (D. Colo. 2005), 
rev’d, 500 F.3d 1170 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 94. Simpson v. Univ. of Colo. Boulder, 500 F.3d 1170, 1178 (10th Cir. 2007).  
 95. Weckhorst v. Kan. State Univ., No. 16-CV-2255-JAR-GEB, 2017 WL 3674963, at 
*8 (D. Kan. Aug. 24, 2017). 
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 Courts in other cases have also drawn similar 
distinctions, thus rejecting official policy liability.
97
 
Similarly, absent allegations of a causal connection between an 
institution’s policy and a threat of sexual assault, courts have rejected 
attempts to challenge training, grievance, or other policies.
98
 In one case, a 
federal court refused to dismiss challenges to Stony Brook University’s 
grievance procedures because the university “had actual knowledge of a 
‘significant increase in reported sexual assaults at Stony Brook over the 
                                                                                                             
 96. Id.  
 97. See, e.g., K.S-A v. Haw., Dep’t of Educ., Civ. No. 16-00115 ACK-KJM, 2018 WL 
2144143, at *16 (D. Haw. May 9, 2018) (“Here, unlike in Simpson, there does not appear to 
be any evidence suggesting that Defendant created a situation which would encourage 
harassing conduct such that it needed to provide further training and policies to prevent such 
conduct from occurring.”); Tackett v. Univ. of Kan., 234 F. Supp. 3d 1100, 1107 (D. Kan. 
2017) (“Plaintiff attempts to graft Simpson liability by alleging KU required its female 
rowers to attend football games and cheer for the players as they entered the field, even if the 
rowers had been sexually assaulted by the players. Plaintiff also alleges that KU has an 
official policy and practice of entertaining football recruits in hotel just off campus and 
encouraging female KU athletes to attend parties with the recruits. But these alleged policies 
played no part in plaintiff’s rape. Encouraging attendance and cheering at football games is 
not the equivalent of pairing female students with recruits to show them a good time.”) 
(internal citations omitted); C.T. v. Liberal Sch. Dist., 562 F. Supp. 2d 1324, 1340 (D. Kan. 
2008) (“Unlike CU’s program of showing football recruits a ‘good time’ that was at issue in 
Simpson, a mere weight training program does not bear the element of encouragement of 
misconduct by the school district.”).  
 98. See, e.g., Doherty v. Am. Int’l Coll., No. 17-CV-10161-IT, 2019 WL 1440399, at *6 
(D. Mass. Mar. 31, 2019) (citing and contrasting Simpson in case where the plaintiff “has not 
shown how the identified training materials could lead a reasonable jury to conclude that 
AIC’s training of the relevant officials was obviously deficient as to constitute a deliberate 
indifference to provide its Title IX administrators proper training”); Raihan v. George 
Washington Univ., 324 F. Supp. 3d 102, 109 (D.D.C. 2018) (“But ‘the failure to promulgate 
a grievance procedure does not itself constitute “discrimination” under Title IX,’ and neither 
does non-compliance with federal regulations.”) (quoting Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. 
Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 292 (1998)); Kollaritsch v. Mich. State Univ. Bd. of Trs., 298 F. Supp. 
3d 1089, 1104–05 (W.D. Mich. 2017) (stating that “MSU’s alleged failure to publish and 
distribute information about its sexual harassment policies and procedures” is 
distinguishable from the facts of Simpson because “[p]laintiffs here have not identified an 
official policy of MSU that created situations where sexual harassment or sexual assaults 
had occurred in the past, and where the risk had been ignored”); Doe v. Emerson Coll., 271 
F. Supp. 3d 337, 356–57 (D. Mass. 2017) (concluding that Title IX only imposes liability for 
insufficient training policies where a school “sanctions a specific program that, without 
proper control, would encourage sexual harassment and abuse such that the need for training 
or guidance is obvious”) (quoting C.T., 562 F. Supp. 2d at 1339). 
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 The court further found that the deficiency of the university’s 
responses to and policies regarding sexual assaults, which OCR had 
previously criticized, justified denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss 
and permitting the plaintiff’s claim of official policy discrimination to 
proceed.
100 
Also, in another case not involving official policy liability, the 
Eleventh Circuit held a school district liable under Title IX for its failure to 
improve its discipline, recordkeeping, and sexual harassment training 
following a student rape.
101
 In reaching this conclusion, the court reasoned 
that, had it been stronger, the sexual harassment training may have 
prevented the rape.
102
 Though most decisions have failed to apply official 
policy liability, two recent cases seem to buck this trend. 
2. Plaintiffs Successfully Allege Official Policy Claim Against the 
University of Tennessee 





 alleged that they were sexually assaulted 
by male students affiliated with the football and basketball teams while 
enrolled at the university.
105
 Each plaintiff attributed their assault to 
institutional indifference to prior instances of misconduct known to 
university officials.
106
 Further, the plaintiffs alleged several specific policies 
had put them at risk of the sexual assault they ultimately experienced.
107
 
The Tennessee district court found that the plaintiffs had alleged a prima 
facie case under the Gebser/Davis standard, and that they had sufficiently 
                                                                                                             
 99. Tubbs v. Stony Brook Univ., No. 15 Civ. 0517 (NSR), 2016 WL 8650463, at *9 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2016). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Hill v. Cundiff, 797 F.3d 948, 973–75 (11th Cir. 2015). 
 102. Id. In this case, a staff member who was not sufficiently trained orchestrated a 
scheme to use the plaintiff as “bait” to catch a student who was threatening to sexually 
assault her. Id. at 973–74. The court considered these examples of post-assault policy inertia 
not on their own, but as part of an overall analysis of the school district’s deliberate 
indifference under Gebser/Davis to the threat this perpetrator was known to pose. Id. 973–
75. 
 103. Doe v. Univ. of Tenn., 186 F. Supp. 3d 788, 791 (M.D. Tenn. 2016). 
 104. Id. The other plaintiff’s alleged injury was retaliation for participating in an 
investigation into the sexual assault of her teammate and roommate, who was also one of the 
other plaintiffs. Id. at 800. Such retaliation is actionable under Title IX but is outside the 
scope of this Article. See id. at 809. 
 105. Id. at 791.  
 106. Id.  
 107. Id. at 791–92. 
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alleged discriminatory official policies.
108
 Applying Gebser/Davis, the court 
found that the plaintiffs had “allege[d] far more than UT’s knowledge of 
general risks or stereotypical assumptions[.]”
109
 According to the court, 
university officials had been “put on notice of a specific and concrete 
pattern of an ‘inordinate’ number of sexual assault allegations against 
members of specific [athletic] teams.”
110
 
Concerning the plaintiffs’ discriminatory official policy claims, the court 
accepted plaintiffs’ allegations that the university promoted or sustained a 
culture that gave rise to the sexual violence they experienced.
111
 For 
example, the athletic department allegedly encouraged players to host 
“parties with underage drinking to benefit recruiting.”
112
 Further, the 
athletic department adopted as the football team’s anthem the song “Turn 
Down for What,” which the court noted to be “associated with ‘sexual 
violence and rape culture.’”
113
 The department even went so far as to 




The athletic department also failed to modify a housing policy that 
permitted female freshmen and upper-class male athletes to reside in the 
same dorm, even though the dorm served as the location for many of the 
plaintiffs’ sexual assaults and prior assaults.
115
 Moreover, the court found 
that certain actions that the athletic department took allegedly helped foster 
a culture that encouraged sexual misconduct.
116
 Namely, the department 
had allegedly engaged in a pattern of covering up past instances of sexual 
misconduct committed by athletes; arranged for their legal representation; 
                                                                                                             
 108. Id. at 805–06. 
 109. Id. at 807. 
 110. Id.  
 111. Id. at 806–08. 
 112. Id. at 793 (quoting the First Amended Complaint ¶ 23 (Docket No. 22)). 
 113. Id. (quoting the First Amended Complaint). 
 114. Id. (citing the First Amended Complaint ¶¶ 148–153). 
 115. See Complaint at 44, Doe v. Univ. of Tenn., 186 F. Supp. 3d 788 (M.D. Tenn. 2016) 
(No. 3:16-CV-199), 2016 WL 503310. In response to multiple alleged assaults in 2011, a 
university official unsuccessfully urged the athletic department and other university officials 
to address the rash of sexual assaults perpetrated by athletes, such as by changing the 
housing policies and ending their interference and influence over disciplinary process. Id. at 
9–12. 
 116. Univ. of Tenn., 186 F. Supp. 3d at 806–08. 
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interfered with and influenced the disciplinary process; and allowed athletes 
to avoid or delay discipline in order to complete their seasons.
117
  
In addition, the plaintiffs alleged that the university and athletic 
department’s response to their reports of sexual assault amounted to both 
deliberate indifference and discriminatory official policy.
118
 Specifically, 
the plaintiffs alleged that the university’s intentional delay of proceedings, 
tolerance of harassment, lax enforcement procedures, and failure to conduct 




The plaintiffs sought damages and injunctive relief, but the university 
moved to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims.
120
 Accordingly, the court 
considered whether the allegations, if proven, could give rise to liability 
under Title IX.
121
 The court denied the motion.
122
 While the case settled 
before the litigation could proceed further,
123
 the court’s preliminary ruling 
provides a touchstone for assessing the kinds of facts that, if true, could 
give rise to liability under Title IX under a theory of discriminatory official 
policy. 
3. Plaintiffs Successfully Allege Official Policy Liability Against Baylor 
University  
In another case, fifteen plaintiffs filed two separate lawsuits against 
Baylor University alleging that Baylor’s discriminatory official policies and 
indifference to specific prior instances of assault led to each of them being 
sexually assaulted by another student.
124
 While some of the alleged 
assailants were members of the football team and other men’s athletics 
                                                                                                             
 117. Id. at 793–94. 
 118. Id. at 791–92. 
 119. Id. at 793–95. 
 120. Id. at 800.  
 121. Id. at 804–08. 
 122. Id. at 815–16. “The ‘before’ claims of Jane Does II–IV and VI–VIII will proceed, as 
will Jane Doe V’s retaliation claim and the plaintiffs’ claim for injunctive relief.” Id. at 815. 
 123. Marie Andrusewicz, University of Tennessee Settles Sexual Assault Lawsuit, NPR: 
THE TWO-WAY (July 6, 2016, 5:04 AM ET), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2016/07/06/484891430/university-of-tennessee-settles-sexual-assault-lawsuit. 
 124. Doe 12 v. Baylor Univ., 336 F. Supp. 3d 763, 770–73 (W.D. Tex. 2018); Doe 1 v. 
Baylor Univ., 240 F. Supp. 3d 646, 653–56 (W.D. Tex. 2017). These cases were 
consolidated with each other, and with a case that has not yet produced any dispositive 
opinions, Jane Doe 11 v. Baylor Univ., No. 6:17-CV-228-RP. The consolidated case, No. 
6:16-cv-173-RP, is currently pending in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of 
Texas. 
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teams at Baylor, most were not student athletes.
125
 The plaintiffs alleged 
that Baylor University officials, including campus police and health 
services, took inadequate measures in response to their allegations of sexual 
assault. They claim that university officials misinformed victims about their 
rights under Title IX, provided inaccurate information about reporting 
options, discouraged them from reporting, failed to conduct investigations 
and disciplinary proceedings, withheld remedial measures, and failed to 
take steps to prevent campus encounters between the victims and their 
assailants.
126
 As a result, plaintiffs alleged, the absence of accountability 
allowed sexual misconduct to flourish.
127
  
Moreover, during a time period when Baylor received multiple reports of 
sexual assault, the plaintiffs alleged that the university reported zero sexual 
assaults to the Department of Education.
128
 In doing so, the plaintiffs 
alleged that Baylor increased the risk of further sexual assault against the 
plaintiffs.
129
 Baylor moved to dismiss the suit, but, after determining that 
the plaintiffs had successfully alleged claims under both Gebser/Davis and 
official policy liability, the federal court denied Baylor’s motion.
130
  
The court rejected Baylor’s argument that it lacked control over some of 
the alleged assaults that occurred off campus, suggesting that control is not 
a relevant consideration for official policy claims and rejecting the 
contention that universities lack control over events between students that 
occur in off-campus housing.
131
 Citing Supreme Court decisions that affirm 
the relationship between policy and custom, the court also rejected Baylor’s 
argument that employees’ conduct in implementing official policies should 
not count as evidence of those policies’ content.
132
 
In the wake of the court’s decisions denying Baylor’s motions to dismiss, 
the litigation has been in pre-trial discovery phase. But regardless whether 
the case proceeds to trial or settles, the court’s recognition of the plaintiffs’ 
official policy claims, like the decision against the University of Tennessee, 
helps illuminate the potential for official policy claims to promote 
institutional accountability, as examined in the next section. 
                                                                                                             
 125. See Doe 12, 336 F. Supp. 3d at 770–73; Doe 1, 240 F. Supp. 3d at 653–56. 
 126. Doe 12, 336 F. Supp. 3d at 770–73; Doe 1, 240 F. Supp. 3d at 653–56.  
 127. Doe 12, 336 F. Supp. 3d at 779–80; Doe 1, 240 F. Supp. 3d at 661–62. 
 128. Doe 12, 336 F. Supp. 3d at 773; Doe 1, 240 F. Supp. 3d at 662. 
 129. Doe 12, 336 F. Supp. 3d at 770–73; Doe 1, 240 F. Supp. 3d at 661–62. 
 130. Doe 12, 336 F. Supp. 3d at 779–83; Doe 1, 240 F. Supp. 3d at 661–62. 
 131. Doe 12, 336 F. Supp. 3d at 780–81.  
 132. Id. at 782–83. 
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III. Tennessee and Baylor Decisions: Analysis and Opportunity 
Part III will underscore the Baylor and Tennessee decisions’ expansive 
treatment of the elements of a Title IX claim for liability based on 
discriminatory official policy. It will then offer suggestions for application 
of the doctrine in an era of uncertain regulatory enforcement. Specifically, 
this Part highlights the deficiencies in deliberate indifference that are 
resolved through the application of official policy liability. 
A. Analysis of the Tennessee and Baylor Decisions  
After Simpson, a Title IX claim of discriminatory official policy must 
satisfy three elements: (1) there must be an “official” policy, custom, or 
pattern of practice; (2) the official policy must be discriminatory—either 
facially by intentionally treating students differently on the basis of sex, or 
inherently by demonstrating indifference to an obvious threat of sexual 
harassment; and (3) as the Baylor court emphasized, the policy must cause 
the harm in question by exposing the plaintiff to the risk of sexual 
harassment.
133
 The decisions refusing to dismiss official policy liability 
claims against Baylor and Tennessee apply these elements in a way that 
faithfully applies Simpson while maximizing the potential for the doctrine 
to hold institutions accountable. As such, a close examination of these 
recent cases may help breathe new life into the official policy doctrine. 
1. Official Policy  
Both decisions accepted the possibility that plaintiffs could prove that 
repeated actions by university officials could establish a university’s 
“official” policy.
134
 The Baylor decisions addressed this issue most directly 
because Baylor had argued “that its written . . . Title IX policy, and ‘not 
employee violations of the policy,’ constituted Baylor’s official policy at 
                                                                                                             
 133. In one of its decisions, the district court in Baylor’s case stated:  
The Court remains sensitive to concerns that application of the official policy 
rubric to claims involving a school-wide risk of sexual assault may be taken to 
imply that higher education institutions, due to the prevalence of sexual assault 
among college-aged individuals, would face near-constant liability. . . . But the 
official-policy rubric’s extension of liability is limited by its demand that 
plaintiffs demonstrate the misconduct complained of was “not simply 
misconduct that happened to occur [at the school] among its students,” but was 
in fact caused by an official policy or custom of the university.  
Id. at 780 (internal citation omitted) (quoting Simpson v. Univ. of Colo. Boulder, 500 F.3d 
1170, 1174 (10th Cir. 2007)).  
 134. Doe 12, 336 F. Supp. 3d at 782; Doe 1, 240 F. Supp. 3d at 662. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2020
58 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:35 
 
 
the time of the alleged assaults.”
135
 The court rejected this argument, citing 
Simpson and Gebser’s analogy to municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983, which applies to both policy and custom.
136
 Accordingly, to survive a 
motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs’ allegations need only establish that the 
institution’s “practice of inadequately handling and even discouraging 
reports of peer sexual assault constituted an official policy.”
137
  
2. Discriminatory Policy 
The Simpson court explained that an institution’s official policy can be 
intentionally discriminatory if the institution retains the policy in the face of 
evidence that that the policy increases the risk that students will endure 
sexual misconduct.
138
 Because of the nature of the policy and the threat at 
issue in Simpson, the Tenth Circuit examined whether the athletic 
department knew about rampant sexual assault in college football in 
general.
139
 Equally important, however, was whether the department knew 
about past sexual misconduct that, while not identical to the facts in 
Simpson, occurred within the university’s football program.
140
 In light of 
university officials’ knowledge, the policy of allowing unsupervised 
football recruiting visits and encouraging hosts to indulge the recruits was 
indifferent to the known risk and thus intentionally discriminatory.
141
  
The Baylor and Tennessee courts also accepted plaintiffs’ arguments that 
an institutional policy could intentionally discriminate by expressing 
indifference to a known threat.
142
 But the courts’ analysis in each case 
suggests that specific allegations of who knew what about which past 
assaults is not essential for official policy claims, despite the Simpson court 
focusing on those issues.
143
  
                                                                                                             
 135. Doe 12, 336 F. Supp. 3d at 782 (quoting Def.’s Motion to Dismiss Doe 12, Docket 
No. 20, at 8; Def.’s Motion to Dismiss Doe 14, Docket No. 22, at 7–10; Def.’s Motion to 
Dismiss Doe 15, Docket No. 23, at 8–9).  
 136. Id. 
 137. Id.  
 138. See Simpson, 500 F.3d at 1178. 
 139. Id. at 1181.  
 140. Id. at 1180–82. 
 141. Id. at 1184–85. 
 142. Doe 12, 336 F. Supp. 3d at 781–83; Doe 1 v. Baylor Univ., 240 F. Supp. 3d 646, 
660–61 (W.D. Tex. 2017); Doe v. Univ. of Tenn., 186 F. Supp. 3d 788, 806 (M.D. Tenn. 
2016). 
 143. Compare Simpson, 500 F.3d at 1176 (discussing the importance of actual 
knowledge in Title IX official policy claims), with Doe 12, 336 F. Supp. 3d at 779 (holding 
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In Tennessee, the court highlighted allegations that described the 
university’s indifference as a failure to amend its policies and practices 
despite a pattern of sexual assault incidents involving athletes and criticism 
from numerous university officials.
144
 Those officials included university 
personnel outside athletics, others within athletics, and the former vice-
chancellor of the university.
145
 Each official raised concerns about the 
athletic department’s interference with disciplinary proceedings, continued 
practice of co-housing female freshmen and upper-class male athletes, 
refusal to train athletes about sexual assault, and replacement of female 
staff and administrators with male employees.
146
 Notably, the court did not 
compare the facts of those incidents to those that the plaintiff 
experienced.
147
 By declining to do so, the Tennessee court emphasized that 
the proper inquiry in an official policy claim is whether the university had 
general knowledge—rather than actual knowledge—of a specific threat.
148
 
Baylor’s alleged indifference was even more apparent on the face of the 
practices of its staff—tantamount to policies—in obstructing the plaintiffs 
from reporting, handling investigations inadequately, and misreporting 
sexual assault incidents.
149
 In Baylor, the court did not require the plaintiffs 
to allege that university officials were aware of the impact that these 
deficiencies had on specific incidents of sexual assault or campus sexual 
assault in general; instead, the court allowed the obvious 
correlation/connection to speak for itself.
150
 While not requiring the 
plaintiffs to prove university official knowledge of the activities, plaintiffs 
are still bound to show causation between these practices and the 
misconduct they experienced.  
3. Causation  
The most notable aspect of the Tennessee and Baylor decisions is the 
way the federal courts treated the element of causation. In Simpson, that 
                                                                                                             
that actual notice is not required where a Title IX violation is caused by official policy), and 
Doe 1, 240 F. Supp. 3d at 661 (explaining that actual notice is not required in official policy 
cases), and Univ. of Tenn., 186 F. Supp. 3d at 805 (rejecting argument that actual knowledge 
is required for official policy claims). 
 144. Univ. of Tenn., 186 F. Supp. 3d at 793–94, 806–07. 
 145. Id. at 793–94. 
 146. Id. 
 147. See id. 
 148. Id. at 807–08. 
 149. See Doe 12 v. Baylor Univ., 336 F. Supp. 3d 763, 782–83 (W.D. Tex. 2018). 
 150. See id. 
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court found causation where the university created and administered the 
football recruiting program in a way that directly provided the plaintiffs’ 
assailants with access and opportunity to commit sexual assault.
151
 In 
contrast, Tennessee’s discriminatory official policies were alleged to have 
infected the culture of the entire athletic department—not just the football 
program.
152
 And Baylor’s policies were not even confined to the athletic 
department, but allegedly affected the university campus as a whole.
153
  
In this way, the Tennessee and Baylor decisions depart from other cases 
that distinguish Simpson on the grounds that the allegedly discriminatory 
official policy was not targeted at a specific program, such as “football 
recruiting.”
154
 For example, a federal district court in Massachusetts 
declined to hold a university liable for its allegedly insufficient training 
policies by reading Simpson to require a “specific program” giving rise to 
the threat of sexual harassment or abuse.
155
 But as the Baylor and Tennessee 
courts read Simpson, it is not essential that the allegedly discriminatory 
policy operate within a specific university program that gave rise to threat 
of harassment. 
Additionally, as noted above,
156
 some lower court decisions have read 
Simpson to mandate that the policy in question created the threat by 
providing “affirmative encouragement,” such as by pairing high school 
males with freshman female hosts who have been trained and instructed 
only to try to show the recruits a good time.
157
 These decisions have 
allowed allegations to proceed because a failure to hold earlier offender 
accountable could evidence the policy’s active role in creating the threat.
158
 
A university’s policies can play an active role in elevating the threat of 
sexual assault or misconduct by directly causing the conduct at issue, or 
through more remote causes.
159
  
In Tennessee, the athletic department’s policy and custom of helping 
athletes avoid punishment demonstrated institutional tolerance for sexual 
                                                                                                             
 151. Simpson v. Univ. of Colo. Boulder, 500 F.3d 1170, 1184–85 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 152. Univ. of Tenn., 186 F. Supp. 3d at 807. 
 153. See Doe 12, 336 F. Supp. 3d at 769–70; Doe 1 v. Baylor Univ., 240 F. Supp. 3d 646, 
654–56 (W.D. Tex. 2017). 
 154. See supra notes 76–83 and accompanying text.  
 155. Doe v. Emerson Coll., 271 F. Supp. 3d 337, 356–57 (D. Mass. 2017).  
 156. See supra notes 77–85 and accompanying text.  
 157. Weckhorst v. Kan. State Univ., No. 16-CV-2255-JAR-GEB, 2017 WL 3674963, at 
*8 (D. Kan. Aug. 24, 2017). 
 158. See id.  
 159. See supra notes 139–43 and accompanying text. 
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 Consequently, those policies motivated or inspired offenders 
who might otherwise have been deterred had they believed the athletic 
department would hold them accountable.
161
  
In Baylor, the court emphasized that causation is essential and the only 
thing protecting institutions from “near-constant liability” whenever a 
student is raped.
162
 But, at the same time, the court accepted as sufficient a 
causal link between policies that deter reporting and the increased 
likelihood of students experiencing sexual misconduct, without even 
discussing whether the assailants that evaded reporting are specifically 
alleged to be the same assailants that assaulted plaintiffs in the case.
163
 In 
other words, the Baylor court accepted a version of the “culture of 
tolerance” theory that the Tennessee court applied—though in the context 
of an entire campus, rather than just the athletic department.
164
 
The Baylor court implicitly addressed one final aspect of causation 
during its examination of the issue of control. Under the Gebser/Davis 
                                                                                                             
 160. See Doe v. Univ. of Tenn., 186 F. Supp. 3d 788, 794–800, 806 (M.D. Tenn. 2016).  
 161. To be sure, Tennessee was alleged to have actively contributed to the culture by 
endorsing the football team’s appreciation for rap music. Id. at 793. But it’s hard to imagine 
that any court interpreting Simpson to require such an active role as the role as the University 
of Colorado played in constructing the environment for sexual assault would have found the 
rap music nexus to be sufficient. Instead, the allegations about Tennessee’s athletic 
department’s unofficial policy of failing to discipline athletes seems was arguably the 
stronger contribution to the elevated risk of sexual misconduct that the plaintiffs in that case 
alleged. 
 162. Doe 12 v. Baylor Univ., 336 F. Supp. 3d 763, 780 (W.D. Tex. 2018). 
 163. See id. at 782.  
 164. Id. (“Plaintiffs allege that Baylor, ‘its staff, and highest officers,’ with knowledge of 
numerous and detailed reports of sexual assault, ‘maintained a set of policies, procedures, 
and customs . . . that were implemented in a sexually discriminatory manner,’ and ‘permitted 
a campus condition rife with sexual assault,’ that ‘substantially increased Plaintiffs’ chances 
of being sexually assaulted.’”) (internal citations omitted) (quoting the Amended Complaint 
(Docket No. 14)). The court then went on to provide specific examples of the policies 
alleged to be deficient, but did not articulate specific connections between the policies and 
the “campus condition,” or the “campus condition” and the specific threat to the plaintiffs—
allowing these obvious connections to speak for themselves. See id. at 782–83. 
While this Article was in production, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals made a similar 
observation about causation, reinstating plaintiff’s claim that a university’s policy of over-
reliance on informal resolution caused the sexual assault. The court rejected the University’s 
argument that Simpson requires a program-specific theory of causation. Karasek v. Regents 
of the Univ. of Cal., 996 F.3d 1093, 1113 (9th Cir. 2020) (“But we will not foreclose the 
possibility that a plaintiff could adequately allege causation even when a school’s policy of 
deliberate indifference extends to sexual misconduct occurring across campus.”). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2020
62 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:35 
 
 
standard, plaintiffs must allege specific facts that establish institutional 
control over the assailant.
165
 Such controls exist either because the assailant 
is a student or employee, or because the location or context where the 
assault occurred was under institutional control.
166
 Baylor attempted to 
import this requirement to an official policy claim by arguing that the 
plaintiffs did not include allegations that the university had control over the 
assailants.
167
 The court, nonetheless, found the plaintiffs’ allegations “that 
Baylor’s disciplinary measures were inadequate and intentionally 
discriminatory, causing a heightened risk of sexual assault for Baylor 
students” sufficient to evidence control.
168
 The court’s discussion 
demonstrates that the Gebser/Davis inquiry into institutional control over 
the assailant is not relevant in an official policy claim.
169
 Instead, it is 
subsumed by the element of causation: a policy that is not discriminatory or 
indifferent will have materially reduced the risk of sexual assault that the 
plaintiff faced.  
In sum, the Baylor and Tennessee decisions illustrate the potential 
breadth of official policy liability by illustrating: that policy need not be 
written but proven based on the conduct of university employees; that 
intentional discrimination includes indifference to a threat that is generally 
understood rather than specifically predicted by past events; that the 
causation inquiry is not limited to whether universities have actively and 
directly caused the risk of sexual misconduct, but can also be satisfied by a 
showing that the university’s policy demonstrated tolerance for sexual 
misconduct within a program or within the campus as a whole; and that the 
requirement for institutional control over the assailant is not a separate 
requirement for liability, but part of the inquiry as to whether university 
policy has the power to minimize the risk of sexual misconduct that the 
plaintiff experienced. 
B. Potential Applications  
Under the new regulations, the Department of Education will limit 
enforcement to situations that would qualify for money damages under the 
                                                                                                             
 165. Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 644–46 (1999); Gebser v. Lago 
Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290 (1998). 
 166. Davis, 526 U.S. at 644. 
 167. Doe 12, 336 F. Supp. 3d at 781. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 781–83. 
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 As previously noted, such a change is 
unnecessary and unwarranted by the absence of particular fairness and 
notice issues that exist when the courts are evaluating claims for money 
damages by individuals who are essentially third-party beneficiaries to an 
agreement between the government and the institution that conditions 
federal funding on Title IX compliance.
171
 Lowering the regulatory standard 
would likely lead to underenforcement of Title IX. It would essentially 
render both courts and OCR powerless to hold institutions accountable for 
sexual misconduct that does not involve the narrow range of facts that 
would satisfy Gebser/Davis.  
Thus, it is particularly helpful to consider alternatives to Gebser/Davis 
liability. Official policy liability, as first used in Simpson and then 
expansively construed in the Baylor and Tennessee cases, will help ensure 
that Title IX continues to impose accountability on educational institutions 
for their policies and practices regulating sexual misconduct. Specifically, 
this theory of liability addresses three deficiencies in the Gebser/Davis 
theory of liability: first-time perpetrators, off-campus assaults and non-
student perpetrators, and injunction-only cases.  
1. First-Time Perpetrators 
Gebser/Davis liability is difficult to establish in cases where the 
institution had no notice of the threat posed by the alleged perpetrator. 
Generally, in such cases, the perpetrator had not offended previously or had 
engaged in less serious behavior than the offense for which the plaintiff is 
seeking damages. Simpson itself demonstrates the expansive potential here, 
as the court concluded that liability for failing to reform its policies in 
response to knowledge that the football recruiting program in general 
creates a risk of sexual assault, not a risk posted by the specific recruits who 
assaulted the plaintiffs in that case.
172
 
2. Off-Campus Assaults and Non-student Perpetrators  
Off-campus sexual assaults and assaults committed by non-student 
perpetrators are weak candidates for Gebser/Davis liability due to the 
requirement that institutions have control over the sexual assault for 
liability to apply. But as the Baylor court explained, an official policy claim 
does not look at whether the school had control; rather, courts will look at 
                                                                                                             
 170. See supra notes 63–69 and accompanying text. 
 171. See supra notes 16–26 and accompanying text. 
 172. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.  
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whether the policies or customs of the university “caus[ed] a heightened 
risk of sexual assault” for the university’s students.
173
 As such, official 
policy liability may be proper in cases where an institution successfully 
defends itself under Gebser/Davis based on a lack of control over the sexual 
assault.  
To illustrate, imagine a university whose campus security has a policy or 
practice of failing to intervene in cases where students report an on-campus 
threat posed by individuals who are not affiliated with the university.
174
 
Imagine further that a student calls campus security to report that her 
estranged partner, who is not a student, has come to campus and threatened 
her; according to the student, his return is imminent. Consistent with their 
policy or custom, the campus police do not intervene, and the estranged 
partner commits an act of sexual violence that is within the scope of Title 
IX.  
Such a case would likely fall outside the scope of Gebser/Davis on the 
grounds that that the university lacks control over the perpetrator.
175
 But the 
causal nexus between the policy and the increased threat is apparent. The 
university’s policy has increased the risk to the student of enduring violence 
that is protected under Title IX. Moreover, due to the student’s reports, the 
threat is undeniably “obvious” in a way that many or even most non-student 
perpetrators would not necessarily be. 
3. Injunction and Injunction-Only Cases 
Beyond the ability of plaintiffs to seek damages from universities, 
official policy claims premised on deficient policy or custom are good 
candidates for injunctive relief. Policies involving an institution’s training, 
supervision, and disciplinary responses are all potential targets for 
injunctive relief for a successful claim for official policy liability. For 
example, the Tennessee court allowed the plaintiffs’ action to move forward 
on its claims for injunctive relief regarding the university’s failure to 
discipline drinking, drug use, and sexual assault, as well as the university’s 
endorsement of inappropriate parties and biased implementation of 
                                                                                                             
 173. Doe 12, 336 F. Supp. 3d at 781. 
 174. The hypothetical is based on McCluskey v. Utah. Complaint at 41, McCluskey v. 
Utah, No. 2:19-cv-00449-HCN (D. Utah June 27, 2019).  
 175. See, e.g., Hall v. Millersville Univ., 400 F. Supp. 3d 252, 287–89 (E.D. Pa. 2019); 
Karasek v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. 3:15-CV-03717-WHO, 2018 WL 1763289, at 
*12 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2018); Samuelson v. Or. State Univ., 162 F. Supp. 3d 1123, 1126 
(D. Or. 2016), aff’d, 725 F. App’x 598 (9th Cir. 2018). 
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 The availability of judicial relief through 
official policy liability to address these kinds of policy deficiencies is 
particularly fitting in the wake of a new Gebser/Davis standard for 
regulatory action, which could weaken the government’s oversight over 
such matters.  
One thing that could threaten the power of official policy liability to 
enhance institutional accountability on matters of sexual misconduct is the 
requirement that plaintiffs have standing to pursue the injunctive relief in 
the form of prospective policy change. This is not a concern in 
administrative enforcement, since standing is not required to initiate an 
administrative complaint under Title IX.
177
 Nor is it a problem for plaintiffs 
bringing Gebser/Davis claims, as such claims allow plaintiffs to pursue 
compensatory damages for injury that has already occurred.
178
  
However, the Tennessee case provides an example of plaintiffs 
surmounting this obstacle. There, the court rejected the university’s 
argument that plaintiffs who had already graduated lacked standing to 
pursue administrative relief.
179
 The university had cited the Eleventh 
Circuit’s decision in Williams v. University of Georgia for its argument.
180
 
In Williams, the plaintiff prevailed under the Gebser/Davis standard on her 
claim for money damages stemming from a rape orchestrated by a student-
athlete whose coach had allowed him to transfer into the school, despite the 
athlete’s sexual misconduct at two prior schools.
181
 Though the plaintiff 
                                                                                                             
 176. Doe v. Univ. of Tenn., 186 F. Supp. 3d 788, 812–14 (M.D. Tenn. 2016). 
 177. Diane Heckman, Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education: Supreme Court to 
Review Whether There is a Title IX Cause of Action by an Athletic Department Employee for 
Retaliation, 194 ED. L. REP. 1, 15 (2005) (noting that the Office of Civil Rights has “allowed 
individuals to file Title IX administrative complaints on behalf of student-athletes, regardless 
of whether that individual would have judicial legal standing, and would accept confidential 
filings”). 
 178. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983) (differentiating 
between standing to pursue compensatory damages for past harm, which was assumed, and 
standing to pursue injunctive relief).  
 179. Univ. of Tenn., 186 F. Supp. 3d at 813 (“The court is, however, persuaded by the 
plaintiffs’ argument that, even if all of the Jane Does have permanently withdrawn from UT, 
they may still have standing to pursue their claim for injunctive relief as relates to UT’s post-
assault practices, based on the fact that at least some of them are still involved in ongoing 
proceedings (either disciplinary proceedings against their assailants or proceedings 
challenging decisions about their own academic standing).”). 
 180. Id. at 814. 
 181. Williams v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 477 F.3d 1282, 1290 (11th Cir. 
2007). 
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prevailed under the deliberate indifference standard, the court rejected her 




Despite the apparent similarities, the Tennessee court distinguished 
Williams.
183
 First, it noted that, unlike the students in Williams, some of the 
plaintiffs in the Tennessee case were still students at the time of 
litigation.
184
 Moreover, their claims alleged a widespread pattern of Title IX 
violations beyond the particulars of the plaintiffs’ cases, dissimilar to the 
Williams case.
185
 The court found that even if none of the plaintiffs were 
still enrolled students, they would still have standing to pursue injunctive 
relief against the university’s disciplinary policies and customs.
186
 For 
example, some of the plaintiffs were still involved with those disciplinary 
proceedings, and some “felt forced to leave school because their assailants 
ha[d] not been adequately disciplined” but wished to return to the school if 
the injunctive relief was granted.
187
 This analysis demonstrates that 
standing, while challenging to prove for student plaintiffs seeking 
injunctive relief, is not an insurmountable obstacle. Therefore, while 
standing must be strategically considered by attorneys while drafting 
complaints, the doctrine does not necessarily undermine the viability of an 
accountability strategy built on official policy liability claims.  
In fact, the Tennessee court’s analysis of standing within the context of 
an official policy claim raises the question of whether a student would even 
need to be sexually assaulted to challenge deficient policies and practices if 
they are only pursuing injunctive relief, instead of pursuing both injunctive 
relief and money damages. If the plaintiff in such a case could prove that a 
university’s policy or practice heightened the risk of sexual assault because 
it was deficient in the face of an obvious risk, why would a sexual assault 
actually need to occur? Any plaintiff who experiences that heightened risk 
could arguably allege an injury sufficient to satisfy the standing 
requirement. If this interpretation is true, special interest groups could 
possibly seek to litigate changes to university policies that might result 
from the Department of Education’s anticipated weakening of the 
regulatory standard. 
                                                                                                             
 182. Id. at 1299, 1303. 
 183. Univ. of Tenn., 186 F. Supp. 3d at 814. 
 184. Id. at 813–14. 
 185. Id. at 814. 
 186. Id. at 813. 
 187. Id.  
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Though most Title IX cases challenge institutional responses to sexual 
misconduct under the Gebser/Davis framework, another theory of liability 
aimed at challenging discriminatory official policy already exists and has 
precedent in sexual misconduct cases. As evidenced by two recent 
decisions in cases involving sexual misconduct at the University of 
Tennessee and Baylor University, there is potential for a more expansive 
interpretation of this theory than courts have generally rendered to this 
point. Whether it leads to judicial remedy or merely increases pressure on 
schools to settle, official policy liability possesses untapped potential for 
leveraging Title IX to hold educational institutions accountable for 
instances of sexual assault and misconduct. Given that institutions may 
have less to fear from the government’s enforcement after new regulatory 
changes take effect, the time is ripe to raise the profile of Title IX’s theory 
of official policy liability. 
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